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Abstract 
This paper exposes the non-state actors of repression by describing their roles and modus operandi, and their 
impact on citizens and the power of the state as the monopolizer of legitimate use of coercion or physical force. 
Repression is perceived as the coercive use of power through physical actions that may include different types of 
violence by the state and certain non-state actors to induce or prohibit certain behaviors, responses, or actions 
from citizens, and oppositions, as a way of communicating or strengthening the authority of a state, monarch, or 
government. It also includes the use of information and intelligence to create situations of oppression for citizens. 
Repression is a widespread practice in modern society and a challenge to the interactions and relationships of 
citizens and nations.  
 
1. Introduction 
Repression as a state-induced strategy to control and foster ‘social order’ has been viewed from various 
perspectives, and mostly negatively, as it often involves political threat or threat of violence, physical action, and 
human rights abuse1. Repression can be defined as the act of subduing someone by institutional or physical 
force.2 While the state is viewed as having the monopoly to the legitimate use of force or coercion and other non-
physical legitimized means, non-state sponsors of repression have been just as active throughout human history 
as mechanisms of repression across societies and nations. There are various non-state actors of repression, and 
the degree to which states engage repression can vary depending on perceived challenge and the need for change. 
This paper exposes the non-state actors of repression by describing their roles and modus operandi, and their 
impact on citizens and the power of the state as the monopolizer of legitimate use of coercion or physical force. 
 
2. Non-State Actors of Repression 
Because the respect for citizens and regard for their rights vary from government to government, the degree to 
which the state uses physical force, and to which it employs non-state actor repression also varies.3 Non-state 
actors of repression tend to be more violent and unrestrained in their actions against citizens or civilians as 
evidenced in torture, extrajudicial killings, and excessive imprisonment or detainment without rights.4 There are 
several different non-state actors of repression that can be identified as active across the globe. These include 
militias and informal groups, and informal groups are especially noted for their economic interests as non-state 
organizations fostering and facilitating repression.5 Other non-state actors of repression may include non-state 
militias to which the state or some regimes delegate authority. 6  Several non-state actors of repression are 
explored below. 
 
2.1 Informal Groups 
Informal groups have served as powerful non-state actors of repression from the early days of organized society, 
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by acting in what they perceive is the particular interest of the state and populace, despite the questionable 
strategies and tactics they might use. These informal groups are often motivated by economic and political 
interests, and are believed to be ‘goods-seeking agents’. Many informal groups see association with the state as 
an economically and even strategically beneficial way to growth and survival. Thus, to many informal groups 
that become non-state actors of repression, their own purpose or reason for being is realized in their actions and 
association with the ‘legitimate’ power of state mechanism that enforces control or wields authority that is 
immediately recognized by and fear by citizens or the people or civilians. Informal groups like pro-government 
militias assume great deal of responsibility and accountability that can free the state from questions concerning 
justice, equal rights, and in case of human rights issues and challenges from equal or even lesser authorities. 
Their degree of effectiveness will vary with size, power, and the degree to which they can influence and obtain 
outcomes in particular situations. More so, their leadership becomes a critical factor in their success. The use of 
new media – social media in the 21st century has become significant in creating opportunities for both informal 
groups and pro-government militias in conflicts involving civilian and non-civilian groups. 
Informal groups that are non-military in nature represent strong support for states in their attempts at 
repression by creating an ideological bridge for support from among the general population or oppressed. It is 
often the case that many do not understand the ways and means of repression, and can become part of such 
mechanisms by virtue of passive or active support and endorsement. This is seen in the media where extreme 
leftist governments have used state media control mechanisms to embolden and build the legitimate power of 
dictators and support their inhumane and unjust policies and actions. Informal groups with strong economic 
power are especially strong as non-state actors of repression because of their influence on state policies via 
political connections and social influence. 
 
2.2 Social Media and Religious Groups 
Over the past decade, social media groups have become very powerful in aiding repression by the state as they 
engage communication and social networking to bolster policies that are dangerous to citizens and their well-
being. For example, social media groups have emerged that support everything from anti-immigration policies to 
anti-gay politicians and policies that increase and advocate for the discrimination and mistreatment of various 
groups across society. 
Religious groups can be very powerful non-state actors of repression, especially when a dominant and 
largely influential religious group or authority figure takes the perspective or side of an oppressive government 
or regime and influences actions and policies against minorities or other religious groups. This is often the case 
in Middle Eastern, Asian, and Southeast Asian territories where religious authority is still revered, and where 
powerful clerics can influence actions and reactions. Social media and religious groups influence repression with 
far less responsibility and accountability than militias and informal groups, and this makes them particularly 
challenging to restrain as they use ideology to accomplish their purpose of supporting states in their repressive 
acts against citizens, especially minority citizens. 
 
2.3 Militias 
It has often been the case that in disruptive regions or nations, military leaders have tended to “subcontract the 
task of control and repression to allied militias that have the local intelligence skills necessary to manage the 
civilian population” (924).1 As Eck notes, these militias may sometimes be delegated by the state to take action, 
and can be known by various names, including most popularly in some regions as pro-government militias 
(PGM), and are armed groups that can take sole or partial responsibility for the use of state-authorized coercion 
in territorially delimited areas. 2  States may make this choice because of the roles and consequences of 
responsibility and accountability in preserving the state as the legitimate authority of coercive force, as well as to 
maintain political balance. 
In many countries across the globe, the authority of states is being challenged on a daily basis, and as a 
result, repression is becoming more commonplace in certain regions of the globe. Whatever the case maybe, 
“two factors will increase the probability of states delegating control to a proxy militia, namely, military purges 
and armed conflict”.3 In many regions of the world where military conflicts are ongoing, the use of repression is 
a daily part of the approach that the state, legitimate or non-legitimate, employs in maintaining its presence and 
power. Moreover, military purges are used to fortify the strength of new governments or regimes that view 
repression as a vital factor in discouraging resistance from opposing parties as well as the general population. 
Among the non-state actors of repression, militias are feared more than any other because they are armed and 
brutal in their assault and often go unpunished. 
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3. When Repression Becomes Extreme 
There are instances where practices of repression have gone to the extreme, and this has been witnessed across 
the globe various times in both armed and unarmed conflicts. For example, conflicts between tribes on the 
African continent have created instances of purges such as tribal purges, as well as genocide as seen in case of 
the Rwandan Genocide, and also witnessed with the Kurdish population in Saddam’s Iraq. It is not simply 
sanctions that drive the state to extreme cases of repression, but usually attack directly against the state that 
serves to threaten and undermine the legitimacy of a standing government or administration, especially a 
dictatorial regime. As Franz and Kendall-Taylor note, the motivation of dictators or dictatorial regimes using 
repression is quite clear.1 Dictators often seek to suppress any group or individuals that come to question their 
authority because such authority originally is or was obtained and/or maintained through illegitimate means or 
are perpetuated through inhumane, cruel, and often extreme violations of human rights. While sanctions have 
been the cause of drastic actions by states, physical attack or other provocations including attempts to overthrow 
government create more extreme cases of repression than other acts. 
Sanctions have certainly worsened human rights violations in targeted countries over their uses in the last 
several decades.2 However, originally meant as non-violent policy alternative to the sort of military interventions 
we have witnessed with the Administration of George W. Bush in 2001 and beyond while dealing with Iraq and 
terrorism, sanctions have sparked significant backlash in the form of various repressive strategies by targeted 
countries and their regimes. These sanctions by virtue, have made the lives of citizens more agonizing as they 
become the point through which these regimes vent their anger and frustration with outside intervention. 
 
4. Conclusion 
States vary in their use of repression, and the degree to which non-state actors of repression are present vary 
from society to society, and region to region. Democracy seems to be less rigged with repression because of the 
tenets and principles by which such a system functions, and because of the inherent respect for their citizens and 
their rights. Repression is the use of physical force or other threatening and violent strategies and approach to 
discouraging action, inciting fear and gaining conformance from citizens. It should be discouraged by both the 
state and non-state actors. However, the use of physical force and threat has become useful in instances to 
suppress violence or discourage behaviors detrimental to governmental and social order from and by citizens. 
Since the state has been the monopolizer of legitimate use of force, it is important to understand how sharing this 
“power” with non-state actors creates challenges and can result in even greater violations of human rights and 
dignity. 
Repression may be more widespread than scholars and researchers would like to think as evident from the 
pervasiveness of human rights violations across nations. Furthermore, as Hafner-Burton notes, “a substantial 
percentage of states repress their citizens” (593).3 Given this understanding, it should not be surprising that many 
states make use of non-state actors to facilitate repression on many fronts. These non-state actors use force in 
frightening ways that sometimes seem even more extreme than the state because of the lack of officialdom, 
bureaucratic structures, and their lack of dependence on the populace for public support, as this is not vital to 
their existence. 
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